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Does Pragmatism Have A Theory of
Power?
Joel Wolfe
1 Power is one of the key concepts in the social sciences (Clegg & Haugaard 2009: 1; Stoker
2010: 19).  In political science, concepts of power have a long and rich heritage, from
Machiavelli  and  Hobbes  to  Robert  Dahl,  Steven  Lukes,  Michael  Mann,  and  Michel
Foucault. Usage of the concept indeed pervades political science, though the scholarship
that explicitly discusses a concept of power is small in comparison to studies of political
phenomena that use implicit and unexamined notions of power. 
2 Attempts to classify these usages into analytical traditions point to the importance of
various meta-theoretical traditions in determining the meaning of the concept of power.
Stewart Clegg (1989) highlights the agency, disposition, and facilitative conceptions of
power, linking them to Hobbesian and Machiavellian traditions in political thought. In a
not  dissimilar  vein,  Mark  Haugaard  (2002:  2-4)  points  to  four  “language  games”
commonly used to analyze power: the analytical conceptual type clarifying terms, the
non-conceptual type adopting notions that fit research purposes (agency), modern social
theory (dispositional) and postmodern social theory (facilitative). What is notable about
these characterizations is that the different approaches to power reflect the philosophical
traditions of empiricism, realism, and interpretism. Visions of power, in short, develop
from different theoretical starting points. 
3 The absence of recognition of pragmatism’s contribution to conceptions of power stands
out. Its contribution to the social sciences was substantial during the first decades of the
twentieth  century  in  America,  influencing  the  progressive  movement,  debates  about
democracy, the sociology of the Chicago school, the symbolic interactionism of Herbert
Blumer,  and the institutional  economics  tradition of  T. B. Veblen,  J. R. Commons,  and
J. K. Galbraith. It then lost its impetus from WW II until a revival in the 1990s (Wolfe 1998;
Baert 2003; Mancias 1998). Today pragmatism inspires and animates a growing movement
among philosophers and social scientists. 
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4 Furthermore, pragmatism is often accused on ignoring the analysis of power or even
worse assumes a view of power that is overly idealistic and airy fairy. Dewey’s emphasis
on consensus, cooperation, and social improvement may at first seem vulnerable to such
interpretations. Critics charge that pragmatism is simply naive about power. Typical is
C. Wright Mills’ claim that John Dewey’s focus on discussion and consensus ignores the
reality of conflict over values and elite domination. Similarly, John Diggins (1994: ch 7)
rebukes Dewey for refusing to discuss power and seeing it as an aberration. Even the
prominent pragmatist social theorist Han Joas writes that “it may be true – as many
critics say – that pragmatism is in need of a theory of power” (Joas 1998: 194). 
5 Efforts to challenge this negative claim are few. One is Roudy Hildred’s (2009) article,
“Reconstructing Dewey on Power,” in which he presents a well-argued case debunking
the idea that Dewey ignored power. After thoroughly surveying those denouncing Dewey,
Hildred elaborates how key Deweyan concepts implicitly contain a concept of power. His
careful analysis concludes that Dewey’s view of power is a complex version of the agency
notion  of  power  as  capacity,  the  probability  of  an  agent  imposing  her  will  against
resistance, enriched by consideration of “social customs and habits, and relative to the
transactional  fields  of  experience”  (Hildred  2009:  782,  799).  This  interpretation  sees
Dewey  as  consistent  with  the  widely  accepted  agency  conception  of  power,  often
identified with Max Weber (1958: 180) and Robert Dahl (1968). 
6 A second is my own article, “Power: A Pragmatist View” (Wolfe 2002). This agrees that
Dewey’s  philosophy  implicitly  contains  a  concept  of  power  but  argues  that  Dewey’s
pragmatism offers multiple views of power. Dewey’s most basic idea of power, I explain,
refers to making differences through conjoint action within a social medium. Only when
such effective social practices are absent is it possible to identify power as interactional
instances of conflict between wills, structures, or expertise. Developing this distinction, I
identify two types of power: power as indirect or intrinsic to social media and as direct or
manifesting traits of pressure and resistant, facilitation and constraint.
7 To elaborate the thesis  that  Dewey’s  pragmatism implicitly formulates an analysis  of
power  that  centers  on  an  indirect,  intrinsic  or  transactional  conception  and  entails
distinguishing different types of power involves the following steps. First, the discussion
shows  how Dewey’s  philosophical  perspective  provides  a  theory  of  praxis  that  is  in
essence a tacit theory of power. Second, the account shows how Dewey’s theory of praxis
provides for distinguishing different modes or types of power. A third section considers
how Dewey’s approach to power offers tools for determining the distribution of power. A




8 A  pragmatist  framework  of  inquiry  views  human  beings  as  participants  and
experimenters in a community of inquiry, breaking with the Cartesian tradition that sees
humans  as  “spectators”  discovering  foundations  and  then  deriving  more  complex
knowledge  from  these  foundations.  “Man  as  agent  comes  into  the  foreground  here
because human agency is the key for understanding all aspects of human life, including
human inquiry and knowledge” (Bernstein 1971: 177). Action and creativity become the
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central theme, with knowledge both depending on action and guiding action in difference
making (Joas 1996). 
9 The turn to praxis or human activity follows from Dewey’s empirical instrumentalism. His
pragmatist starting point turns foundationalism upside down; it makes ontology result
from inquiry and inquiry follows from concrete problems (Sleeper 2001: 119-21). Instead
of drawing implications from abstract premises, pragmatism starts with experience and
thereafter moves on with the struggle to interpret and control it. Felt qualities are had as
experiences from within and do not originate from predefined notions (Hildebrand 2003:
188-90). Rather doubts or problems that arise need to be denoted first and examined for
possible solutions and decisions. 
10 The  pragmatic  starting  point  rejects  philosophical  foundationalism,  dualism,  and
reductionism. Tests of knowledge are to be found in the consequences of human activity
rather  than  predetermined  by  prior  conceptual  strategy  independent  of  the  actual
exercise of power. Knowledge cannot be defined or measured by conceptual fiat,
determined  by  either  objective  or  subjective  foundations.  This,  in  short,  rejects
traditional Cartesian epistemology in which the mind is a spectator, or “great mirror,
containing various representations – some accurate, some not – and capable of being
studied by pure, nonempirical methods” (Rorty 1979: 12). 
11 Instead, Dewey’s empirical method holds that knowledge results from actively engaging
an empirical dilemma, through an ongoing process “of working back and forth between
the larger and the narrower fields, transforming every increment upon one side into a
method of work upon the other, and thereby testing it” (MW 2: 316; cited in Ratner 1939:
56). To have an experience is to start with a problematic situation, a noncognitive and
qualitative issue, and after that to define and redefine it until a solution is found. Starting
from pure experience is impossible and starting with a theoretical tool restricts the scope
of  what  is  found.  The  empirical  method consequently  is  a  genetic  method in  which
knowledge emerges from a “working back and forth between the technical study of the
intellectualized problems of philosophy and the common world of experience, the socio-
cultural conditions and activities, including the scientific, which generate or are those
problems (Ratner 1939: 56; Ratner’s italics). In contrast to the givens of the empiricist,
pragmatism turns observable sense data into interpretations, “the products of reflective
discrimination,  while  the  situation  from  which  they  are  discriminated  is  not”
(Hildebrand 2003: 186). As Ira Cohen states (2000: 86), “(Dewey’s) theory of praxis is not so
much a theory of habit as a theory of cycles of habit, reflective, rational consciousness,
and behavioral change.”
12 Dewey’s  philosophic  method  for  accumulating  and  correcting  knowledge,  moreover,
allows for elucidating praxis in terms of three overlapping spheres of analysis. Originally
articulated in Dewey’s Studies in Logical Theory (MW 2: 298-315) and highlighted by Joseph
Ratner (1939: 49-50), these intertwined dimensions within Deweyan pragmatism are logic,
modes of experience, and the social world giving rise to problems. The contemporary
pragmatist  sociologist  Hans  Joas  conceptualizes  action  similarly,  as  involving  three
elements of analysis – intentionality, corporeality, and sociality (Joas 1996: 145-95; Jung
2010).  Such elements  hence provide the key dimensions  for  a  pragmatist  analysis  of
operations for the making of differences, the informed action or praxis of social agents
effecting solutions to problematic situations.
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13 The first sphere is logic or inquiry, referring to processes of thinking through options
aiming to solve a specific problem and a concluding judgment or action that makes a
difference by reconstructing a qualitative situation. This replaces the traditional dualism
by proposing that knowledge results from solving problems through the application of
the doubt-inquiry sequence in which agents make inferences and put their judgments to
the test. All knowledge correspondingly is like other types of human activities, such as
medicine  or  farming,  in  being  practical  adaptations  to  concrete  problems.  Viewing
inquiry as organic functioning prevents fixing distinctions between superior and inferior
causes and makes practical activities of examining inferences through experimentation
the source of productive knowledge (Hildebrand 2008: 49). The knower is a participant in
the public processes of inquiry, and human agency takes the leading role in creating
knowledge and understanding human existence. Darnell Rucker (1977: xiv) summarizes
Dewey’s position: “Knowing, whatever its level of abstraction or precision of statement,
has its roots in human activity, and its being as knowledge depends upon the continual
renewal of contact with that activity.” 
14 The centrality of praxis recurs in Dewey’s discussion of experimental inquiry. The Quest
for Certainty points to the historic turn to the practice of experimentation as a superior
tool  for  warranting  knowledge.  Dewey  sees  the  start  of  the  scientific  revolution  in
Galileo’s  move away from grounding knowledge in contemplative enjoyment of  fixed
entities  to  the  conscious  and deliberate  engagement  and control  of  relations  among
existences (LW 4: 76). According to Dewey, experimental methods are distinguished by
three transitive activities. 
The  first  is  the  obvious  one  that  all  experimentation  involves  overt  doing,  the
making of definite changes in the environment or in our relation to it. The second
is the agent’s use of ideas so that experiment is not a random activity, rather it is
directed by ideas which have to meet the condition set by the need of the problem
inducing the active inquiry. The third feature, in which the other two receive their
full  measure  of  meaning,  is  that  the  outcome  of  the  directed  activity  is  the
construction of a new empirical situation in which objects are differently related to
one  another,  and  such  that  the  consequences  of  directed  operations  form  the
objects that have the property of being known. (LW 4: 70)
15 Dewey’s second key philosophical element for difference making is experience. In his
“Need for the Recovery of Philosophy,” Dewey sets out his conception of experience by
pointing to five contrasts with its  traditional  meaning.  Instead of  being a knowledge
affair, experience denotes all modes of interaction between organism and environment;
instead of  being primarily  subjective,  the  subject  and object  relations  are  functional
distinctions arising from ongoing experience;  instead of  centering experience on the
present or the past, it is forward looking; instead of consisting of discrete particulars,
experience is  constructed through transactions;  and instead of  being separated from
reason, experience entails the future, the reconstitution of the present into a different
situation (MW 10; Hildebrand 2003: 36). Experience denotes the praxis of agents’ doings
and undergoings  within unsettled situations  and in  accordance with socially  learned
responses or habits, impelling problem solving and creativity.
16 The central concepts of inquiry and experience link to the third area situating praxis, the
social and natural world that gives rise to problems. The construction of order, as people
move  within  and  through  various  frames  of  discourses  and  action,  resolves  the
uncertainty that cannot be appreciated by reducing it to sense data or to dyadic links
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between such data. Dewey clarifies that the “ultimate value of the logic of experience” is
resolution of social problems: 
The right relationship and adjustment of the various typical phases of experience to
one another is a problem felt in every department of life. […] It may be that general
logic cannot become an instrument in the immediate direction of the activities of
science or art or industry; but it is of value in criticizing and organizing tools for
immediate research. It also has direct significance in the valuation for social or life-
purposes of results achieved in particular branches. (MW 2: 313)
17 As a result, the strategies or solutions that yield control are to be discovered in dealing
with concrete problems, not revealed by analysis of given truths. 
18 Efforts to improve the social medium, to enlarge the community’s ability to control future
activity and results, depend on testing the effect of ideas. According to Dewey (1903: 243),
“We must in any case start from acts which are performed, not from hypothetical causes
for those acts, and consider their consequences. We must also introduce intelligence, or
the observation of consequences as consequences, that is, in connection with the acts
from which they proceed.” Dewey next points to “the objective fact that human acts have
consequences upon others, that some of these consequences are perceived, and that their
perception leads to subsequent effort to control action so as to secure some consequences
and avoid others.” From this, Dewey develops a distinction between private and public
acts,  between  acts  with  consequences  that  directly  affect  those  involved  and  that
indirectly affect others who are unaware or unconcerned at the time. Efforts to regulate
these indirect effects of transactions give rise to the collective function of the state as the
agency determining what is appropriate.
19 In the search for order, pragmatism’s transactional emphasis on human action, rejecting
the  notion  of  the  isolated  individual,  gives  primacy  to  socially  encumbered  actors
responding to and regenerating their social medium. Individuals are not fixed essences
but authors of culturally specific acts learned from and appropriate to the social context.
Social connections among people provide the opportunities and means for carrying out
societal purposes, whereas the self is in fact a social being formed within and through
participation  in  various  social  media.  In  Human  Nature  and  Conduct (1922),  Dewey
elaborates on the social character of human conduct, drawing on the three overlapping
dimensions – a medium of learned practices or habits, the impulse or live energy, and
intelligence from inquiry-based judgment – to conceptualize action or praxis. 
20 In sum,  Dewey’s  philosophical  starting point  centers  on praxis  and the ways  human
action makes differences within and through a social medium, in effect furnishing a tacit
theory  of  power.  His  approach to  theorizing  action through concepts  of  experience,
inquiry,  and  the  environment,  with  ideas  mediating  and  regulating  how  and  why
transactions generating a cooperative instrumentality occur, moves away from standard
interactive  or  dyadic  approaches  to  power.  In  developing  the  Darwinian  model  of
organism and environment into a theory of intelligent action, he presages a cybernetic
vision, by transforming a biological metaphor into one of modes of communication and
social control (Johnson 2010; Burke 1994; Gardner 1985). As Ira Cohen (2000: 84) clarifies,
“if action refers to what actors mean, or intend by what they do, praxis refers to how
actors  make  what  they  do  happen,”  emphasizing  the  role  of  habits  and  inquiry  in
directing practices within and through the unfolding of the social medium. Controlling
what  happens  is  critical  to  pragmatism’s  active  search for  meliorism.  Philip  Jackson
(2006: 65) underscores how central to this is to Dewey’s philosophical achievement, citing
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Dewey’s reflection that his ambition was to have “knowledge turned to account in the
instruction and guidance it may convey in piloting life through the storms and the shoals
that beset life-experience as well as into such havens of consummatory experience as
enrich our human life from time to time” (LW 16: 389). 
 
Praxis and Types of Power
21 Dewey’s analysis of praxis in terms of how agents make differences and how they do so in
order  to  control  future  events  provides  the  basis  for  arguing  that  his  pragmatism
contains a theory of power. Accepting this analysis entails a view of making differences or
power  that  centers  on “power  within”  a  social  medium,  while  making provision for
understanding other types of  power.  Showing that the theory of  praxis establishes a
transactional view of power will allow for differentiating it from inter-actional and self-
actional conceptions. 
22 The framework of analysis that Dewey and Bentley present in Knowing and the Known to
formulate concepts that advance pragmatism and science also provides an analogy for
assessing  the  contributions  of  the  debates  about  power.  They  name  self-action,
interaction  and  transaction  as  three  levels  of  the  organization  and  presentation  of
inquiry that denote “all human behaviors in and with respect to the world, and […] are all
presentations of the world itself as men report it” (LW 16: 100-1; Lavine 1989: xxxiii-
xxxv).  Self-action  identifies  self-possessed  causal  capacity,  interaction  captures  the
balancing  between forces,  and transaction  indicates  systems  of  multiple  aspects  and
phases  without  any  independent  and  final  causal  capacity.1 Assuming  that  the
transactional view of power is central to pragmatism, there are in addition two other
types:  inter-action or  the balancing and exercise of  pressures  via  causal  relations or
structural mechanisms and self-action in which things or beings act in the own right due
to their essence. 
23 At the heart of the pragmatist view of power is the idea of a transactional organization in
which aspects or phases of an organic whole can be distinguished but not be separated
from an  ongoing  functioning  of  a  continuous,  self-moving  social  medium.  This  self-
organizing phenomena consists of  elements bound together through meaning,  intent,
signs,  and other  mentally  constructed ways  of  giving significance to  the way agents
connect events (Bernstein 1973: 182-3). In this perspective, actors respond to situations
and  construct  their  lives  in  cooperation  with  others  by  making  their  way  within
transactional, shared, coactive frames of participation. 
24 In contrast to notions of “power over” and “power to,” the pragmatist notion is that
power arises within and operates through modes of joint participation of human activity.
It is the unique role of reason, thought, or ideas in constructing patterns of human action
and experience that conceptualizes power as modes through which agents use intelligent
judgments to generate substantive consequences. According to Dewey, “The only power
the  organism possesses  to  control  its  own future  depends  upon the  way its  present
responses modify changes which are taking place in its medium” (MW 10: 15). Dewey
continues, “It is all a matter of the way in which its present reactions to things influence
the future reactions of things upon it.” Further, he adds that this capacity to increase its
control lies in “The extent of an agent’s capacity for inference, its power to use a given
fact as a sign of something not yet given, measures the extent of its ability systematically
to enlarge its control of the future.” The use of inference highlights the role of individuals
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in  shaping  the  flow  of  the  social  dynamic,  as  mediating  agents  recognizing  and
formulating  attempting  to  improve  their  situation.  Active  agents  rely  on  inference,
involving ideas which connect what happens to what may happen and constituting the
effort to control events. This use of inference in the social or political realm is the same as
science uses in the constituting knowledge through the discovery and determination of
consequences (MW 10: 16). It is this idea of power as “collective intelligence” shaping
associated  activity  and  its  consequences  that  provides  the  unique  perspective  of
pragmatism. 
25 Instead of the press of coercive resources, the constraints and possibilities afforded by
structure,  or  the direction for behavior provided by narratives,  power is  intrinsic  to
human  praxis  because  all  behavior  deals  with  the  consequences  of  transactions  in
progress,  in  operation,  partially  fulfilled,  partially  incomplete.  For  Dewey,  praxis
emanates from a social partnership and has moral or prospective significance. Dewey
writes (MW 14: 16): “Conduct is always shared; this is the difference between it and a
physiological process.” Combining personal disposition with environmental inducement,
influencing future action requires regulating factors, individual or social, guiding future
results;  action or  “habit,”  such as  malice  or  courage,  is  the  way personal  attributes
operate in combination with environmental elements. In dealing with problems, praxis
involves operations, linking processes to consequences and comparing them to desired
ends. The assessment of these operations yields signs of what is happening and what may
happen, which becomes “an indispensable factor in behavior dealing with changes, the
outcome of which is not yet determined” (MW 10: 15). 
26 Intrinsic participation within trajectories of  transactional  accomplishing distinguishes
the primary mode of making differences. In connecting objective changes and subjective
adaptations, habits constitute praxis and carry forward continuity in the adjustment and
readjustment  of  conditions  and operations.  As  Dewey states  (LW 13:  18),  “The  basic
characteristic of habit is that every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one
who acts and undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it or not, the
quality of subsequent experiences. […] For it is a somewhat different person who enters
into them.” Habits project the organized and functional nature of internal dispositions;
they serve as “a moving force” shaping sensibilities, motivations, and interests which
engage the objective and external. Projection, in turn, produces changes in the world,
which challenge agents in new ways. If  action sequences make for a different person
entering into transactions, the effects of past actions make for a slightly different world
that is being entered. Dewey writes (LW 13: 22): 
Every genuine experience has an active side which changes in some degree the
objective  conditions  under  which  subsequent  experiences  take  place.  The
difference between civilization and savagery […] is found in the degree in which
previous  experiences  have  changed  the  objective  conditions  under  which
subsequent experiences take place.2
27 Practical knowledge functions to generate and order social activity. Transactional activity
allows subject-matters to develop their own forms of control  or regulative functions,
testing actions against desired consequences. The application of intelligence through self-
organizing criticism implies the possibility of control of future activity. Indirect control,
that is, the intrinsic, subjective and intellectual participation of persons in the fabrication
of the social medium, combines the way the situation engenders impulses and the way
intelligent guides habits that sequence of enveloping socially co-ordinated actions (MW
10: 44). Participation within conjoint activities depends on individuals adjusting internal
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and external factors. Since ideas realize a capacity for inference by signifying connections
between actions and effects and between present occurrences and future events, ideas
enable individuals to adjust to and control situations in which they take part.  Dewey
summarizes:
The net outcome of the discussion is that the fundamental means of control is not
personal but intellectual. It is not “moral” in the sense that a person is moved by
direct  personal  appeal  from  others,  important  as  is  this  method  at  critical
junctures.  It  consists  in  the habits  of  understanding,  which are  set  up in  using
objects  in  correspondence  with  others,  whether  by  way  of  cooperation  and
assistance or rivalry and competition.  Mind as a concrete thing is  precisely the
power to understand things in terms of the use made of them; a socialized mind is
the power to understand them in terms of the use to which they are turned in joint
or shared situations. And mind in this sense is the method of social control. (MW 9: 38)
28 The practical  character  of  thought  and action,  furthermore,  function to  bring about
effective  accomplishments  in  accord with  the  paradigm organizing  a  social  medium.
Dewey  (LW  13:  22)  writes:  “The  very  existence  of  the  social  medium  in  which  an
individual lives, moves, and has his being is the standing effective agency of directing his
activity.” The “effective agency” is able to control activity because individuals possess
understandings  about  how  to  participate  in  social  life,  enabling  them  to  gauge  the
standpoints  and  behavior  of  other  participants  involved  in  social  cooperation.  Of
education Dewey writes (MW 9: 32), “This other method resides in the ways in which
persons, with whom the immature being is associated, use things; the instrumentalities
with which they accomplish their own ends.” He subsequently illustrates his point: 
If a chair is drawn up to a table, it is a sign that he is to sit in it; if a person extends
his right hand, he is to extend his; and so on in a never ending stream of detail. The
prevailing  habits  of  using  the  products  of  human art  and the  raw materials of
nature constitute by all odds the deepest and most pervasive mode of social control.
(MW 9: 37)
29 Moreover,  reflective monitoring develops into self-control  as the standards by which
individuals  regulate  their  actions  direct  their  participation  in  the  social  medium
(Campbell 1995: 41). Dewey observes: 
The individual is held accountable for what he has done in order that he may be
responsive  in  what he  is  going  to  do.  Gradually  persons  learn  […]  to  hold
themselves  accountable,  and  liability  becomes  a  voluntary  deliberate
acknowledgment that deeds are our own, that their consequences come from us.
(MW 14: 217)
30 The interactional and self-actional types of power receive more attention because they
are more noticeable than power through social media. Force, authority, or organization
dominate when the usual processes of associated action are ignored, breakdown or had
never been established. And their descriptions depend on philosophical starting points
that  fix onto causal  givens.  Dewey’s  philosophical  method explains these inter-active
types  of  power  as  the  result  of  a  breakdown  in  the  functioning  of  meanings  and
intentions  controlling  social  media.  External  factors  are  fixed  as  predominant  in
determining  the  balance  of  pressure  and  resistance,  when  a  social  system  fails  to
coordinate conjoint accomplishments. 
31 These distinctions are brought out in Dewey’s discussions of the First World War. In a
1916  article  responding  to  concerns  about  American  entry  into  World  War I,  Dewey
defended the idea that, contrary to being the equivalent of violence, force was the source
of all effects. He writes (MW 10: 248; Hickman 1992: 187) that “[N]o ends are accomplished
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without  the  use  of  force.”  What  is  needed  to  stop  war,  however,  is  alternative  and
effective  social  arrangements  for  preventing conflicts  from taking the  form of  overt
hostilities.” To support this argument, he identifies three types of force distinguished by
their efficiency: power or self-directed participation, coercive force such as the use of
law,  and  violence  or  the  wasteful  application  of  force.  Here  identifying  power  with
organized  and  self-directed  activity,  Dewey  narrows  the  use  of  the  term  power  to
instances of operations within social media. He maintains (MW 10: 246; see also 211-5),
“Power […] denotes effective means of operation; ability or capacity to execute, to realize
ends.” That is, power is the effective functioning of a social medium, the intrinsic self-
control  by  agents  participating  in  operating  a  social  apparatus.  Coercive  force  and
violence  are  interactional  and rely  on external  or  objective  types  of  control.  Dewey
observes (MW 9: 31), “When others are not doing what we would like them to or are
threatening disobedience, we are most conscious of the need of controlling them and of
the influences by which they are controlled.”
32 Interactive models, nonetheless, dominate the literature on power. For example, political
science  has  long  held  the  view that  power  is  a  question  of  who  controls  in  whose
interests. Harold Lasswell (1936) famously formulated this question as “Who gets what,
when and how?” This conventional view of power, however, presupposes epistemological
and objective dualisms, between knowledge and action, facts and values, and elites and
led.  The  result  is  to  focus  attention  on  interactional  types  of  power,  prefiguring
conclusions confirming domination by the few. Dewey’s critical approach to philosophical
foundations, further, contends that much conceptualizing of domination is the outcome
of the conceptual fixing of the key causal elements determining outcomes. For example,
empiricist foundations foreshadow an agency notion of power, realism a dispositional
notion,  and  interpretism  a  disciplinary  notion  of  power.  Various  philosophical
perspectives  specify  primary forces  that  prefigure what  power is  and how it  can be
organized.  They  offer  distinct  and  different  insights  by  privileging  diverse  meta-
theoretical  foundations or givens.  This means that different meta-theoretical  starting
points interpret phenomena through the lenses of various types of relational phenomena,
phenomena  seen  to  involve  conflict  between  interacting  elements  and  to  have  the
prerogative of being the decisive fixed and final factor as the source of causation. 
33 Finally, the self-acting modes of interpreting reality rely on a being’s or a thing’s own
essence as the force propelling changes. This way of thinking can be found in Plato’s
forms, Hegel’s Geist, theological doctrines in which God controls human action. Recently,
this  mode of  thinking resurfaced in the “return of  the state”  movement  in political
science, a theoretical trend arguing that the institutional essence of the state should be
seen to make it an agent in its own right (Skocpol 1985). 
 
Praxis and the Structure of Power
34 The pragmatist analysis of the structure of praxis provides insight into the distribution of
power. This focuses on which values control action and how these values shape ways of
operating in order to control their effects. In the Quest for Certainty, Dewey writes: 
When theories of values do not afford intellectual assistance in framing ideas and
beliefs about values that are adequate to direct action, the gap must be filled by
other means. If intelligent method is lacking, prejudice, the pressure of immediate
circumstance,  self-interest  and class-interest,  traditional  customs,  institutions of
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accidental  historic  origin,  are  not lacking,  and  they  tend  to  take  the  place  of
intelligence. Thus we are led to our main proposition: Judgments about values are
judgments about the conditions and the results of experienced objects; judgments about that
which  should  regulate  the  formation  of  our  desires,  affections  and  enjoyments.  For
whatever decides their formation will determine the main course of our conduct,
personal and social. (LW 4: 211-2)
35 To analyze the “whatever” allocating control of consequences that Dewey alludes to in
the passage above brings out the value-orientations implicated in the habits that actors
use within ongoing situations and how these functional processes entail judgments about
the desirable. The structure of power, thus, arises from and can be analyzed by examining
the ways  actors  operate  to  control  events.  Examining  what  values  control  ways  of
functioning exposes what matters most and for what ends.
36 Though Dewey did not himself discuss the question of the way praxis distributes control,
his conception of the practical character of thought and action offers tools for clarifying
the way the elements of praxis operate to pattern coordinated operations and control
effects. Here again the three overlapping circles of analysis – inquiry, experience, and
social media – come into play. 
37 The first element, the social elements of custom and habit, involves analyzing how social
media  establish  interests  and,  in  turn,  how  individual  motive  selects  a  specific
environment  and offers  appropriate  responses.  The practical  character  of  knowledge
means that motives and practices of activity are neither given by external authority nor
permanently  fixed  (see  Dewey  1929).  They  depend  on  the  inheritance  of  historical
circumstances  and  dynamics  within  which  an  agent’s  internal  capacities  adjust  to
external circumstances. Working from a pragmatist tradition, C. Wright Mills expresses
this idea in his discussion of the cultural apparatus. He writes: “Every man interprets
what  he  observes  –  as  well  as  much  that  he  has  not  observed:  but  his  terms  of
interpretation are not his own; he has not personally formulated or even tested them”
(Mills 1967: 406). Dewey’s effort to shift analysis away from first principles, foundational
concepts, or fixed truths establishes the need to examine the use and adaptation of the
medium. Rather than being subordinated to the purely subjective or an independent
reality, experience is a matter of the transaction of a living being within its environment,
the ways the objective world affects human action and is in turn modified by it. 
38 Instead of relying on first principles and reified causal forces such as wealth or weapons,
Deweyan analysis  suggests  that  the basis  of  action be located through empirical  and
intellectual scrutiny of cultural tools conditioning experience. The use of these cultural
tools or habits operates in the unfolding of trajectories within a medium. For Dewey,
habits “assimilate objective energies, and eventuate in command of environment” (MW
14: 15-6).  Habits for Dewey reflect prior activity, provide an ordering of elements for
action, are projective and dynamic, and are operative in making activity manifest (MW
14:  31).  They also give form to stages in a sequence of  ordering a situation through
craftsmanship. They appear analogous to the operative character of the developmental
patterns identified by Jean Piaget’s concept of schema, the self-organizing projections
which  a  child  uses  to  assimilate  the  world  and  which  undergo  reorganization  or
accommodation in response to that world (Piaget 1963). Tom Burke interestingly offers
an innovative suggestion for a way of analyzing the operation of the cultural apparatus.
He proposes that universal propositions, one of Dewey’s logical modes, can be used to
analyze ideology or systems of ideas and how they function in social life (Burke 2004).
Applying this insight suggests that Dewey’s concept of habit may be characterized in
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terms of his own conception of the types of logical propositions and the way they operate
to  fashion  a  cultural  medium.  Such  a  project  may  aid  in  clarifying  links  between
operations and effects,  even facilitating in formulating the way connections between
conditions  and  consequences  may  yield  desirable  results.  In  short,  a  first  step  in
unpacking structures of praxis and power must be to examine the logical operations or
habits by which the subject-matter of an existing social medium prescribes and projects
norms and ends and how these include or exclude, privilege or deprive, the particular
interests comprising the conditions within which agents operate. 
39 A second element follows from Dewey’s understanding of experience, analyzing the ways
agents respond to and endure their media. This locates agency within cultural toolkits
and appreciates its transactional dynamics, identifying initiative in deciding problems
and possible  responses.  By  implication,  this  view rejects  the  dualism of  agency  and
structure central to current debates about power; instead, it offers the view that there is
only human praxis and that action generates effects that are often reified and taken as
structural  forces in their own right.  Dewey’s emphasis on the insurgent and creative
character of  human action means that  experience involves projection via habits  into
circumstances not fully known; it is experimentation for the purpose of connecting with
the future. As human actors undergo a circumstance, they simultaneously attempt to
control it. 
40 Pragmatism further emphasizes the rebellious, projective and educative nature of human
experience, while rejecting simple and mechanical causal relations between independent
units. For Dewey, individuals are “live creatures,” never totally passive (LW 10: 9-25).
Their experience involves “simultaneous doings and sufferings.” As Dewey writes (1917:
8), “The most patient patient is more than a receptor. He is also an agent – a reactor, one
trying experiments, one concerned with undergoing in a way which may influence what
is still to happen.” Dewey continues (MW 10: 9), “Our undergoings are experiments in
varying the course of events; our active tryings are trials and tests of ourselves.” As a
living organism, individuals strive to turn their circumstances into sustenance aiding
their life prospects. Analyzing the way agents use things to operate within the dynamic
and interdependent relations of  specific situations,  then,  reveals the loci  of  initiative
within the media and the craftsmanship of  agents in functioning to sustain complex
systems of cultural operations.
41 A third element in analyzing the distribution of power, the criterion of decision, involves
the role of inference and judgment in transforming problems into consequences. Dewey
(MW 2: 296) proposes that reality is remade through the doubt-inquiry-judgment process,
which functions through experience in accordance with the test of consequences and for
the purpose of “readjusting and expanding the means and ends of life.” Thinking projects
possible consequences or solutions through the interpretation of events (MW 10: 15-6). In
so doing, thinking concludes with a conjecture which serves as the criterion determining
conduct transforming a questionable situation. Judgment selects and applies a standard
or rule of operation that terminates a problematic situation and creates an existential
unity (Burke 1994: 109). Dewey writes in How We Think (LW 8: 215), “The judgment when
formed  is  a  decision [his  emphasis];  it  closes,  or  concludes,  the  question  at  issue.”
Resolving problematic situations requires action transforming objective circumstances,
the application of inquiry’s results in devising a more effective link between the difficulty
and the desired effects.
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42 Significantly, acts of judgment producing transforming differences are both instrumental
and consummatory. They are instrumental because they facilitate the achievement of
desired ends through coordination and control of collective accomplishment. And they
are consummatory because power relations promote communication, a “sharing in the
objects and acts precious to a community, a sharing whereby meanings are enhanced,
deepened and solidified in the sense of communion” (LW 1: 159). 
43 The connection between the instrumental, substantive, and consummatory values and
qualitative  situations  affects  the  way  judgments  operate.  When  instrumental,
“intelligence is  partial  and specialized,  because communication and participation are
limited, sectarian, provincial, confined to class, party, professional group” (LW 1: 159).
When bureaucratic organization, the imperatives of technical necessity, or the privileging
of  rational  self-interest  become  uppermost,  action  is  mechanical  and  self-indulgent.
Absolutes or externally divined duty also denies participation. 
44 In short, the analytical elements of Dewey’s theory of praxis identify how the distribution
of social  control varies,  the way operations affect who decides what and how and so
constitute a medium controlling participation and effects. While the theory of praxis and
power frame a  transactional  description of  activity,  it  also  facilitates  the analysis  of
patterns of control in interactional and self-actional modes of praxis. Whatever the type
of social conjunction, examining how values shape its modes of operating illuminates the
substantive consequences of what gets done. 
 
Consequences For Conceptualizing Power 
45 The transactional  conception contrasts  with interactional  characterizations of  power,
namely, “power over” and “power to,” that dominate the current literature. Agency and
structuralist formulations attribute the generation and exercise of power to the balance
of resources, consent, traditions, or institutions. In the “faces of power” debate, power
resides with agents who are equipped with various armaments giving them control of the
agenda  and/or  decision-making.  Structuralists  locate  the  control  of  interests  and
decisions in objective institutional constraints and mechanisms. As Hay (2002: 185) states:
“Power  then  is  about  context-shaping,  about  the  capacity  of  actors  to  define  the
parameters of what is socially, politically and economically possible for others.” Foucault
locates power in a cultural entity he calls disciplinary knowledge, itself an expression of
power. It also contrasts with self-actional descriptions of difference making. Each of these
identifies power as the result of external imposition. 
46 Dewey’s transactional conception of praxis informs a view of power centering on the
ways  agents  compose  and  operate  within  evolving  social  media.  Power  arises  from
intellectual  control  of  participation in  conjoint  association and it  the  distribution of
control depends on the purposes animating the flow linking agent and environment into
modes of activity. Dewey would agree with Hannah Arendt’s assertion in that “Power is
never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only
so long as the group keeps together” (Arendt 1969: 137), though he would emphasize that
a group is itself a creation of the value-laden and knowledgeable praxes of its members.
This means that control inheres in the values directing the flow of actions forming the
social apparatus.
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47 The transactional focus on recursive operations generating modes of social co-operation
emphasizes the crucial role of the agency of human actors and their use of ideas and
habits  to  control  conduct  as  they  construct  and  reconstruct  activities  moving  them
through life. In patterning interactions actors use ideas and habits as practical guides to
particular consequences, as the tools for constituting social co-operation. Changing the
social  expectations  agents  use  to  hold  themselves  accountable  for  their  behavior
redefines  the  way  things  get  done.  As  understandings  directing  activity,  ideas  are
operative  predispositions.  The  practical  effect  is  to  establish  the  accountability  that
controls conduct in particular contexts. Further, because transactions are dynamic and
contingent applications of operations to social situations, power is created, variable, and
tentative as agents conjointly engage in transactions arising from changing problems. Not
fixed and given, variation in structure occurs as agents respond to their situations, for
example, the fading of a honeymoon phase of a newly elected US President. Thus, power
is intrinsic to human conduct, since inquiry and judgment afford control of ways of acting
on and with things and the differences made.3
48 One consequence is that the praxis theory of power dismisses the concept of structure as
a thing or essence with causal force, challenging the structure versus agency debate so
prominent  in  the  social  science  literature.  The  transactional  view  dispels  the
philosophical realist notion that agents are mere bearers of the interests of institutions
and that power lies in controlling institutional incentives as well as the critical realist
contention that structure is the medium and result of agency. The pragmatist views these
notions of structure as examples of the interactional models’ reliance on reifying and
fixing analytic categories. 
49 A second implication is that the centrality of experience to praxis means that individuals
have a degree of autonomy in affecting change. Action that is informed and deliberate is
intelligent, projecting desirable effects and checking their results. This enables human
beings to control the quality of their future experience (Thayer 1968: 200). As adaptive
behavior,  the  intelligent  use  of  ideas  through  the  scrutiny  of  consequences  makes
possible  more  fruitful  and  desirable  experience  (LW  1:  17).  Therefore,  intelligence,
inquiry,  and ideas  enable  individuals  to  make a  difference to  themselves  and to  the
contexts in which they operate. About his pragmatism, Dewey writes that it brings “into
prominence the importance of  the individual  […]  [for]  It  is  he who is  the carrier  of
creative thought, the author of action, and of its application” (LW 1: 20). Human beings
are  participants  and  experimenters in  organic  processes,  including  a  community  of
inquiry. According to Dewey (LW 1: 20), “The individual mind is important because only
the  individual  mind is  the  organ of  modifications  in  traditions  and institutions,  the
vehicle of experimental creation.” Relatively autonomy, then, stems from human praxis
and the self-reflection guiding participation in social processes responding to changing
environments. 
50 The autonomy afforded by praxis means further that questions of values and justice are
crucial. By turning conditions into consequences, ideas operationalize values; they give
expression to what is regarded as worthy. Action requires taking the responses of others
into account and having one’s actions taken into account. Social transactions rely on and
produce socially regulated behavior. To make a moral judgment is to decide “whether
what  is  good  in  immediate  experience  has  consequences  for  latter  experience  that
warrant accepting the immediate good as a true good” (Rockefeller 1991: 407). Inquiry
into the desirable or undesirable influences the character or habits of the inquirer and
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requires the application of a standard of judgment that actualizes priorities (Kennedy
1970: 87-90).
51 The  pursuit  of  objectives  through  a  social  medium  means  that  power,  in  addition,
involves efficiency in operating. The organization of energy into social media increases
working efficiency.4 Dewey observes, “Nevertheless force is efficient socially not when
imposed upon a scene from without, but when it is an organization of the forces in the
scene” (MW 10: 215). The more efficiently power operates the less external, violent force
will be relied upon. Moreover, the more direct power is, the more it is open to public
controversy. Since direct control operates in a more exposed arena, it incites further
coercion in order to suppress emerging conflict. Contrary to an empiricist worldview in
which agents engage in overt tests of strength and imposition, the efficient achievement
of ends depends on organizing the way individuals coordinate their own actions within
the larger project of collective accomplishment. And pragmatism’s interest in efficiency
assumes that consequences regulate power rather than, as with Nietzsche and Foucault,
power itself determining fact and truth (Weberman 1995).
52 Finally, the transactional conception of praxis and power exemplifies a method of critical
analysis for deconstructing power structures. It makes evident that ideologies rely on
political  rhetoric  or  metaphor  functioning  to  blind  us  to  the  ways  their  theoretical
starting points entail power and effects. This critical function is important to creative
democracy, based on challenges to and judgment about the use of power for common
good and  growth (Hildred  2009:  794-6,  799).  More  generally,  pragmatism’s  empirical
method  provides  a  tool  for  critically  “seeing”  the  antecedently  fixed  assumptions
empowered  to  produce  the  theoretical  and  empirical  outcomes  in  modern  research
schools, providing a system for examining how their philosophical assumptions prefigure
their models of power. In Experience and Nature, Dewey recounts this critical analytical
method,  namely,  the  philosophical  fallacy,  as  a  way  of  unmasking  the  effects  of
theoretical  starting points (LW 1:  10-41).  By taking antecedent givens as foundations,
Dewey argues, theorists prefigure how and what they find. This meta-philosophical tool
calls for the identification of assumptions that prefigure representations of nature and
their  effects  and suggests that  their  illumination provides  for  their  control.  Dewey’s
empirical method, in particular, asks how meta-theory frames the way actors justify their
activity,  gain  initiative,  and  are  held  accountable  to  what  they  value,  that  is,  how
philosophical givens prescribe the ‘desired’ perception and interpretation. This idea, that
what  we see is  attributable to our own ways of  experiencing things,  can be used to
analyze models of power in political ideologies as well as theoretical approaches (Wolfe
2011:  138).  Further,  as  articulated  in  Reconstruction  in Philosophy,  it  challenges  social
theory’s  preoccupation with debating and refining notions  about  its  tools  of  inquiry
instead of solving concrete problems (Ratner 1939: 63). Even more, this critical capacity to
deconstruct  power phenomena suggests  a  way of  giving meaning to  the concepts  of
subjective and real interests by the exposure of modes and structures of power (Amit
2008). The pragmatist critique thus enables us to get beyond a political theory’s claims to
represent  reality  and instead to  examine how its  initial  conceptual  categories  imply
consequences for the way relations of control ought to be exercised. 
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Conclusion
53 In rejecting the philosophical starting points underlying the empiricist agency, realist
dispositional or  structuralist,  and  interpretist  facilitative  models  of  power,  Deweyan
pragmatism provides a theory of praxis that is a tacit theory of power. This offers an
indirect or transactional view of the ways human praxis makes differences within and
through a social medium. A social medium, such as a class or game, carries power in its
collective consequences in shaping conditions reacting on agents. It also is a framework
of  control  since  participants  require  understanding  about  how  it  operates  and  self-
control in their application of knowledge in order to bring the social medium into being.
This view holds that the social medium is the primary mode through which differences
are made. Yet, if indirect control through the social medium breaks down, direct control
through  various  types  of  relational  enforcement  occurs.  In  other  words,  Deweyan
pragmatism recognizes that power also operates through inter-actional modes, such as,
force,  unequal  resources,  public  consent,  law,  a  generalized capacity,  expertise,  or  a
structural  property  of  institutions.  Further,  different  forms or  patterns  within social
media represent different distributions of control. These depend on the ways different
social paradigms motivate and inform praxis, how different experiences enable agents to
use their range of options to take initiatives within these frameworks, and what value-
orientations control judgments. The resulting variations in the type and form of conduct,
finally, provide a means for improving the quality of future events. 
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NOTES
1. There are parallels between the Dewey and Bentley categories of description and action and
C. S. Pierce’s categories of Firstness (givenness), Secondness (balance of pressures or forces), and
Thirdness (expressions of meaning and intention through triadic linkages between agent, sign,
situation) (Bernstein 1971: 177-87). 
2. Tom Burke (1994:  39)  characterizes continuity as  linking two “orthogonal”  dimensions:  1)
static and dynamic and 2) internal and the external.
3. The  view that  power  is  productive  and ubiquitous  is  also  found in  the  work  of  Anthony
Giddens 1984, and Michel Foucault 1979. 
4. This pragmatist view shares a concern for efficiency with Machiavelli and Foucault. See Clegg
(1989: chapters 2, 7), Rabinow 1984, Rouse 1994.
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ABSTRACTS
Asking if pragmatism, and John Dewey in particular, has a theory of power poses the question
about the intellectual resources that pragmatism has to offer the social sciences. Pragmatism
stands accused of being naïve about power and presenting the specter of an overly soft program
for doing social science. Yet, Dewey’s philosophical method provides a distinctive transactional
theory  of  power  and  untapped  resources  for  advancing  social  science.  Dewey’s  melioristic
philosophical vision develops a theory of praxis that is a tacit theory of power. Explicating his
concerns with experience, inquiry, and social life show how they converge into his theory of
praxis  and power.  Developing  this  theory,  next,  enables  distinctions  to  be  outlined  between
Dewey’s transactional view of power and the mainstream interactional view seen in the work of
Dahl, Lukes, and Mann. Furthermore, the theory of praxis establishes analytical categories for
deconstructing the structure of transactional power, the patterns or modes of conjoint activity.
Dewey’s  pragmatist  theory  of  power  stands  in  marked  contrast  to  interactional  models  and
provides the analytical tools for the critical assessment of power. 
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